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THE REGRESSION OF “GOOD FAITH” IN  
MARYLAND COMMERCIAL LAW 
 
By: Lisa D. Sparks, Esq.* 
 
     “Good faith,” in the affirmative or as the absence of bad faith, has always 
been a challenge to define and judge as a matter of conduct, motive, or both.  
Different tests apply a subjective standard, an objective standard, or even a 
combination of the two.  Some parties may be held to different expectations 
than others.  This determination of good faith has always been fact-driven 
and somewhat transcendental.  Until recently, however, the question invoked 
a construct of fairness, resting on a two-pronged metric, at least insofar as 
several key titles of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code were 
concerned.  Since June 1, 2012, the various Maryland Uniform Commercial 
Code definitions of good faith have been stripped to the bare, subjective 
“honesty in fact.”1  The ramifications of this deviation from the Uniform Law 
Commission’s2 promulgated Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and 
decades of jurisprudence with consistency among most states have yet to 
unfold; the bench and bar are just discovering the change.  This comment 
explores how this occurred and what the potential consequences are and also 
recommends remediation of Maryland’s statutory language to conform to the 
UCC. 
 
I.     A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
     The Maryland Uniform Commercial Code was enacted in 1963, with an 
effective date of February 1, 1964.3  It later became the nine leading titles of 
the Commercial Law Article, along with ten other non-uniform titles in the 
recompilation and reorganization of the Annotated Code of Maryland in 
1975.4  Over time, the Commercial Law Article has expanded to 23 titles in 
                                                                                                                             
* Lisa D. Sparks, Esq., is the Practitioner in Residence at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law, teaching a variety of courses including Commercial Law, Sales & 
Leases, Construction Law, and a Master Class in Trial Lawyering. She is also Of 
Counsel at the Baltimore, Maryland law firm of Wright, Constable & Skeen, LLP.  
J.D., B.A., University of Baltimore.  
1 H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
2 The Uniform Law Commission is also known as the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
3 H.B. 671, 1963 Leg., Ch. 538 (Md. 1963). 
4 1975 Md. Laws Ch. 49.  The current sequence of MUCC titles is: Title 1: General 
Provisions; Title 2: Sales; Title 2A: Leases; Title 3: Negotiable Instruments; Title 4: 
Bank Deposits and Collections; Title 5: Letters of Credit; Title 6: Bulk Transfers; 
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all.5  Titles 1-10 are commonly referred to as the Maryland Uniform 
Commercial Code6 (“MUCC”).  As is the case with most uniform codes and 
comprehensive statutory schemes, Title 1 provides general provisions, 
including definitions, governing the remaining titles.7  The definition of good 
faith in Title 1 was then, as it remains today, “honesty in fact in the conduct 
or transaction concerned.”8   
     As Maryland adopted the Uniform Law Commission’s additions and 
revisions to various articles, additional definitions for good faith emerged.  
Titles 2 and 2A, governing the sales and leases of goods, added a separate 
provision for merchants: “good faith in the case of a merchant means honesty 
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing 
in the trade.”9  This notion of commercial standards spread to Titles 3 
(Negotiable Instruments) and 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) in 1996 
following Maryland’s adoption of the 1990 UCC revisions, but covered all 
parties involved as opposed to just merchants.10  Official comment 4 to UCC 
section 3-103 explained the significance and intent surrounding the use of 
this expanded, two-part definition in the title governing negotiable 
instruments: 
 
Subsection (a)(4) introduces a definition of good faith to 
apply to Titles 3 and 4.  Former Titles 3 and 4 used the 
definition in Section 1-201(19).  The definition in 
Subsection (a)(4) is consistent with the definitions of 
good faith applicable to Title 2, 2A, 4, and 4A.  The 
definition requires not only honesty in fact, but also 
“observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing.”11 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Title 7: Documents of Title; Title 8: Investment Securities; and Title 9: Secured 
Transactions. 
5 Title 10 is an administrative title, Effective Date and Repealer, for amending Titles 
1-9.  Titles 11-23 cover a wide range of additional commercial matters, including 
trade regulation, credit, consumer protection, regulation of certain industries, debt 
collection, and certain electronic transactions. 
6 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-101(a) (2013). 
7 The UCC designates its numbered components as articles.  Because the Annotated 
Code of Maryland is already divided into subject matter articles, the MUCC is 
broken down into titles. The numbering, however, is nearly identical and the labels 
“article” and “title” are often used interchangeably in Maryland case law. 
8 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 
1-201(19) (2002 Repl. Vol.); MD. CODE, Art. 95B, § 1-201(19) (1957). 
9 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2A-103(3) (2002 Repl. Vol.). 
10 1996 Md. Laws Ch. 91. 
11 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3-103, cmt. 4 (2002 Repl. Vol.). 
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Title 4’s definition section was revised to simply relate back to the expanded 
definition in Title 3 so that the good faith considerations for negotiable 
instruments and check collection processes were consistent.12  Title 4A, 
regarding wire funds transfers, used the same language as Title 3.13  Title 8, 
governing investment securities, also picked up the two-pronged definition of 
good faith.14    
     In a provision of far narrower applicability, section 7-404 provides 
immunity for bailees who deliver or dispose of goods in accordance with a 
document of title so long as they acted “in good faith including observance of 
reasonable commercial standards.”15  According to this section’s official 
comment, “[t]he generalized test of good faith and observance of reasonable 
commercial standards is substituted for the attempt to particularize what 
constitutes good faith in the . . . old uniform acts.”16 
     The net effect of these scattered provisions was that all transactions 
governed by the MUCC were conducted under a general obligation of 
subjective good faith.17  For particular parties and transactions, an objective 
standard was overlaid, applying a rule-based measure of compliance.18  It is 
important to note that Maryland law does not recognize an independent cause 
of action for breach of the duty of good faith in the MUCC or otherwise.19  
Instead, the prescribed duty of good faith applies in the context of the 
performance or enforcement of an obligation arising under the MUCC.20 
 
A.     MARYLAND’S 2012 LEGISLATION 
 
     In 2012, the Maryland General Assembly unanimously adopted various 
revisions to the MUCC.  Many of the amendments were a belated adoption 
of the Uniform Law Commission’s 2001 revisions to Article 1.21  House Bill 
700 titled “Commercial Law – Uniform Commercial Code – Revisions to 
Title 1” stated this purpose: 
 
                                                                                                                             
12 Id. at § 4-104(c). 
13 Id. at § 4A-105(a)(5) cmt. 3. 
14 Id. at § 8-102(a)(10). 
15 Id. at § 7-404. 
16 Id. 
17 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-203 (“Every contract or duty within Titles 1-10 of 
this article imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enhancement.”). 
This provision has been stylistically edited and moved to § 1-304. 
18 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2A-103(3), 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c), 
4A-105, 7-404, 8-102 (2002 Repl. Vol.).  
19 See Howard Oaks, Inc. v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 810 F. Supp. 674, 677 (D. Md. 1993). 
20 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-304 cmt. 1 (2002 Repl. Vol.). 
21 See U.C.C §§ 1-101 – 1-310 (2001). 
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[R]evising, updating, reorganizing, and clarifying Title 1 
of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (MUCC) 
relating to general provisions applicable to the MUCC; 
establishing a certain short title; clarifying the 
transactions to which Title 1 of the MUCC applies; . . . 
making certain stylistic changes; defining certain terms; 
altering and repealing certain definitions; making 
conforming changes to certain provisions of the MUCC; 
and generally relating to the Maryland Uniform 
Commercial Code.22 
 
House Bill 700’s reach went far beyond Title 1, however, amending sections 
of Titles 1, 2, 2A, 3, 4, 4A, 5, 8, and 9.23   
     In its original form, as proposed and first read in the House Economic 
Matters Committee on February 8, 2012, House Bill 700 included this Title 
1, § 1-201 definition: “(20) ‘Good faith’, except as otherwise provided in 
Title 5 of this article, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.”24  This revision, bringing an objective 
component to the general definition governing all titles, save Title 5 by 
express exclusion, rendered the corresponding definitions scattered 
throughout the MUCC redundant and unnecessary.  Sections 2-103(1)(b), 3-
103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), and 8-102(a)(10) were deleted in their entirety and 
marked with “Reserved” placeholders.25  Sections 2A-103(3) and 4-104(c) 
were similarly deleted by virtue of their aforementioned reference sections 
being deleted.  House Bill 700, as originally drafted, tracked the Uniform 
Law Commission’s 2001 revisions to Article 1.26 
                                                                                                                             
22 H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012); see also 2012 Md. Laws Ch. 673 
(the stated purpose remained the same from proposal through enactment). 
23 H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (repealing, reenacting, and amending 
§§ 1-101 – 1208, 2-103, 2-202, 2A-103, 2A-501, 2A-518, 2A-519, 2A-527, 2A-528, 
3-103, 4-104, 4A-105, 4A-106, 4A-204, 5-103, 8-102, 9-102). 
24 Id.  
25 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), 8-
102(a)(10) (2013). 
26 The Uniform Law Commission’s Reporter’s Notes elaborate on the rationale for 
consolidating the definition of good faith in Article 1.  “Reasons for change. Current 
UCC section 1-201(19) defines ‘good faith’ simply as honesty in fact; the definition 
contains no element of commercial reasonableness. Initially, that definition applied 
throughout the Code with only one exception. UCC section 2-103(1)(b) provided 
that ‘in this Article’ ‘good faith in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.’ This 
alternative definition was limited in applicability . . .  Over time, however, 
amendments to the UCC brought the Article 2 concept of good faith (subjective 
honesty and objective reasonableness) into other Articles. First, Article 2A explicitly 
incorporated the Article 2 standard. See U.C.C. section 2A-103(7). Then, other 
Articles broadened the applicability of that standard by adopting it for all parties 
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     The Revised Fiscal Policy Note attached to House Bill 700 demonstrates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the multiple definitions of good faith, 
which existed throughout the MUCC prior to the 2012 revisions.27  In the 
“analysis” portion of the report, a bill summary provides that “[t]he bill alters 
the definition of good faith to mean honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned.”28  In the “current law” segment, the report cites that 
“‘Good faith’ is defined as honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned.”29  There is no alteration in that language.  Furthermore, no 
mention is made of the deletion of other sections and definitions of good 
faith. 
     Two letters of support, or written testimony, were received by the 
Economic Matters Committee.  Both supporters were responding to the 
version of House Bill 700 that expanded the definition of good faith to 
include an objective standard in order to promote fairness and consistency.  
One letter from the Maryland Commission on Uniform State Laws urged the 
adoption of the updates presented in House Bill 700 (as well as House Bill 
713, affecting Title 9 only30) to make the MUCC “consistent with the most 
recent revisions of the UCC Articles 1 and 9[,]” especially where the Article 
1 updates “have already been enacted by all but a handful of states.”31  The 
testimony makes clear that the Maryland Commission on Uniform State 
Laws was in favor of the inclusion of an objective standard in the Title 1 
definition of good faith, citing that provision specifically and in detail:  
“Revised Definition of Good Faith – Reasonable commercial standards are 
added to definition of ‘good faith’, providing an objective and fairer standard 
for courts to enforce to obligations and duties set forth in the various articles 
of the UCC.”32  
     A second letter supporting adoption was submitted by the Uniform 
Commercial Code Subcommittee of the Business Law Section of the 
                                                                                                                                         
rather than just for merchants. See, e.g., U.C.C. sections 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), 
8-102(a)(10). . . and of revised sections 2-102(a)(24) (Sept. 1996 draft) and 9-
105(a)(18) (Annual Meeting draft). All of these definitions are comprised of two 
elements - honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing. . .. Given this near unanimity, it is appropriate to move the definition of 
‘good faith’ to Article 1.”  U.C.C. § 1-201 reporter’s notes. 
27 H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (Revised Fiscal and Policy Note).  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 H.B. 713, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
31 Letter from Steven N. Leitess, Comm’r, Md. Comm’n on Unif. State Laws, to Del. 
Brian Feldman, Md. H.D. (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with the Md. Dep’t of Legislative 
Servs.).  
32 Id. 
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Maryland State Bar Association.33  This group also pressed for consistency 
with updates to the UCC.34  This letter’s summary of the addition of 
reasonable commercial standards to the Title 1 good faith definition was 
identical to the one in the first letter.35  The author of this letter appeared 
before the committee hearing on February 21, 2012.  It is unclear whether he 
gave testimony, but he did indicate that he was in favor of the legislation. 
     The only other witness who registered at the February 21, 2012 hearing 
before the Economic Matters Committee was a representative of the 
Maryland Bankers Association,36 who indicated by checking a box that his 
testimony was favorable with amendments.37  An amendment was indeed 
introduced at some point during this committee hearing.38  The amendment 
struck the objective, reasonable commercial standards language in the Title 1 
good faith definition, essentially reverting back to honesty in fact.39  This 
amendment did not maintain the status quo, because no effort was made to 
restore the existing two-part definitions of good faith in Titles 2, 2A, 3, 4, 
4A, and 8.40  With this single amendment, which was passed by the House of 
Delegates following a second reading on March 17, 2012, the net effect of 
House Bill 700 was to strip away the objective standard of good faith in the 
MUCC.41  The annotations do not contain legislative history notes to explain 
the purpose or intent of this revision.  Moreover, the published comments in 
the annotations are in line with the UCC and do not explain Maryland’s 
departure from the uniform language.42 
 
                                                                                                                             
33 Letter from K. Lee Riley, Jr., Chair, Unif. Commercial Code Subcomm., Bus. Law 
Section, Md. State Bar Ass’n, to Del. Brian Feldman, Md. H.D. (Feb. 21, 2012) (on 
file with the Md. Dep’t. of Legislative Servs.). 
34 Id. 
35 The inclusion of identical summaries of the proposed Title 1 good faith definition 
revision by both supporters suggests that the language appeared in the original Fiscal 
and Policy Note in the bill summary section.  The original report is not available in 
the bill file for comparison or verification. 
36 The finance and banking industry is the most likely to oppose the application of an 
objective standard.  See Patricia L. Heatherman, Comment, Good Faith in Revised 
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Any Change? Should There Be?, 29 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 567, 590 (1993). 
37 Hearing on H.B. 700 Before the H. Comm. on Econ. Matters, 2012 Leg., 430th 
Sess. (Md. 2012) (witness sign-up sheet). 
38 ECONOMIC MATTERS COMMITTEE, AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 700, H.B. 700-
863493-1, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).   
39 Id. 
40 Id.  Recall that prior to House Bill 700, several titles of the MUCC contained their 
own definitions of “good faith” including, in some titles, an objective component. 
41 H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (2013)). 
42 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 1-201 cmt. 20, 3-103 cmt. 4, 7-404 cmt. 
(2013). 
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II.     THE SUBJECTIVE VS. OBJECTIVE DEBATE 
 
     The distinction between a pure subjective (honesty in fact) and an 
objective (compliance with some standard(s)) methodology for good faith 
determinations is more than just semantics and represents a substantive 
divergence in applicable law - leading to different outcomes.  The debate 
between these two competing options is not, however, new.  Courts have 
grappled with how best to judge a party’s conduct on a continuum as long as 
commercial cases have been litigated.43  Indeed, both tests date back to early 
nineteenth century English cases.44  In recent history, the 1990 UCC 
revisions expanding the definition of good faith in Article 3 sparked a 
broader conversation in the context of negotiable instruments and good 
faith’s role in the requirements for a holder in due course.45    
     The purely subjective approach, i.e., honesty in fact, translates roughly to 
a proscription on intentional misrepresentation.  Others have characterized 
this as the “pure heart and empty head” or even “innocent simpleton” test.46  
At one time, the subjective test was considered the majority rule because of 
its applicability across the entire UCC and because some states had declined 
to adopt the 1990 revisions to Article 3 that borrowed an objective prong 
from Article 2’s heightened obligations for merchants.47 
     The objective standard, which is always coupled with the subjective 
standard, is reminiscent of negligence, in that, it introduces a test of 
reasonableness.48  Moreover, the benchmark of “commercial standards” is 
flexible to meet the spectrum of parties and transactions to which it is 
                                                                                                                             
43 See, e.g., Price v. Neal, (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 871, 873 (K.B.); 3 Burrow. 1354, 
1356-7 (“He denied it to be a payment by mistake: and insisted that it was rather 
owing to the negligence of the plaintiff; who should have inquired and satisfied 
himself ‘whether the bill was really drawn upon him by Sutton, or not.’ Here is no 
fraud in the defendant; who is stated ‘to have acted innocently and bona fide, without 
the least privity or suspicion of the forgery; and to have paid the whole value for the 
bills.’ . . . Here was no fraud: no wrong. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff, to be 
satisfied ‘that the bill drawn upon him was the drawer's hand,’ before he accepted or 
paid it: but it was not incumbent upon the defendant, to inquire into it”); see also 
State Sec. Check Cashing, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 409 Md. 81, 93-94, 972 
A.2d 882, 889-890 (2009) (examining the obligations of a check cashing facility 
who later asserts holder in due course status). 
44 Gill v. Cubitt, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B.) (objective standard); Lawson v. 
Weston, (1801) 170 Eng. Rep. 640, 641 (subjective standard). 
45 See generally Heatherman, supra note 37, at 569 (discussing the expansion of 
good faith in Article 3 of UCC); see also U.C.C. §3-103(a)(4) (1990). 
46 Heatherman, supra note 37, at 569. 
47 Id. at 590. 
48 Id. at 584. 
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intended to apply, much like a tort duty.49  The drafters of the UCC took care, 
however, to reject the notion that they intended for a negligence standard to 
apply: 
 
Although fair dealing is a broad term that must be 
defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the 
fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an act 
is performed.  Failure to exercise ordinary care in 
conducting a transaction is an entirely different concept 
than failure to deal fairly in conducting the transaction.  
Both fair dealing and ordinary care, . . . are to be judged 
in the light of reasonable commercial standards, but 
those standards in each case are directed to different 
aspects of commercial conduct.50 
 
     The goal of a combined subjective-objective standard of good faith is to 
balance the protection of innocent parties with the temptation to be willfully 
ignorant.  In specifying commercial standards, which are only reasonable, the 
UCC drafters have artfully avoided creating too high a standard that reflects 
best practices or the most possible fairness.  Moderating the test with 
reasonableness also allows adjustment to the relevant parties and their 
respective levels of sophistication. 
 
III.     RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CURRENT LAW 
 
     Maryland is now one of only a few states without the two-pronged 
subjective-objective definition of good faith in its enactment of UCC Article 
1.51  This undermines the essential purpose of uniform laws, which is to 
establish as much consistency among states as possible.  This is especially 
important for commercial law matters which often stretch across state 
borders and may invoke the laws of multiple jurisdictions within the same 
dispute.  Contract drafters, including lenders and merchant sellers who tend 
to require their own forms and terms, may be enticed to insert choice of law 
                                                                                                                             
49 Id. at 585; see also U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990) (adding a definition for ordinary 
care for those engaged in business: “observance of reasonable commercial standards, 
prevailing in the area in which the person is located with respect to which the person 
is engaged . . .”). 
50 U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt 4 (2002); see also State Sec. Check Cashing, Inc., 409 Md. at 
95, 976 A.2d at 890 (instructing that reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing 
are about fairness and not negligence). 
51 Missouri has yet to adopt any of the 2001 revisions to UCC Article 1. A few 
additional states have enacted non-uniform provisions. For example, Florida has 
maintained subjective good faith for non-merchants in Article 2A only. See FLA. 
STAT. §§ 672.103(1)(b), 680.1031(1)(a) (2010). 
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provisions utilizing Maryland law, which holds them to the lowest standards.  
Forum shopping is also a possibility.  
     The inconsistencies between certain MUCC provisions and the 
explanatory annotations will cause confusion among judges and practitioners 
attempting to utilize, argue, and enforce these provisions.52  Of most concern 
is the lengthy comment about the expansion of the definition of good faith 
following section 1-201.53  While the text remains just “honesty in fact,” the 
comment erroneously explains, in part: 
 
Thus, the definition of “good faith” in this section 
merely confirms what has been the case for a number of 
years as Articles of the UCC have been amended or 
revised – the obligation of “good faith,” applicable in 
each Article, is to be interpreted in the context of all 
Articles except for Article 5 as including both the 
subjective element of honesty in fact and the objective 
element of the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.  As a result, both the 
subjective and objective elements are part of the 
standard of “good faith,” whether that obligation is 
specifically referenced in another Article of the Code 
(other than Article 5) or is provided by this Article.54 
 
Additionally, upon reliance on a revised Title 1 definition, section 7-404 was 
revised to remove the expanded subjective-objective description of good 
faith.55  The official comment now inexplicably reads, “This section uses the 
test of good faith, as defined in Section 1-201, to continue the policy of 
former 7-404.  Good faith now means ‘honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.’”56  Thus, the policy of 
section 7-404 has been changed without an accurate explanation or rationale. 
     Only a handful of published cases have addressed MUCC issues and 
mentioned good faith since the revisions went into effect on June 1, 2012.57  
None have hinged on a determination of good faith for their outcomes.  Over 
time, however, good faith issues will be litigated and courts will be left 
without the benefit of precedent to guide their analysis of good faith issues, 
                                                                                                                             
52 See supra note 44. 
53 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201 cmt. 20 (2013). 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
55 Id. at § 7-404 cmt. (2013). 
56 Id. 
57 See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Nextday Network Hardware Corp., 73 F. Supp.3d 636 
(D. Md. 2014); Thompkins v. Mountaineer Inv., LLC, 439 Md. 118, 94 A.3d 61 
(2014). 
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likely leading to inconsistent outcomes and a tangled web of confused case 
law. 
     An anticipated area where this change in definition, and therefore 
standards of conduct, will have some impact is the establishment of holder in 
due course status.  The exercise of good faith is a key requirement for holder 
in due course status.58  In the current market, banks and check cashing 
facilities are the most likely players to assert holder in due course status as to 
instruments because few people negotiate promissory notes and checks 
otherwise.  Under the prior good faith definition in MUCC section 3-103, 
which required, in addition to honesty in fact, “observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing,” these institutions were expected to act 
and inquire according to what a reasonable party in their position would do.59  
Now, banks and check cashing institutions are treated the same as consumers 
and other unsophisticated parties, held to no higher expectations of fairness 
notwithstanding their superior knowledge, skill and access to information.60  
This regression of banks’ obligations is further illustrated in the context of 
shifting losses where there has been negligence under MUCC section 3-
406.61  In practice, that rule precludes a negligent customer from asserting an 
alteration or forgery against his bank to obtain a re-credit, but only if the 
bank paid the instrument, took it for value or took it for collection in good 
faith.  If the bank does not exercise good faith, it cannot enforce the 
preclusion.62  Where good faith is as simple as “honesty in fact,” 














                                                                                                                             
58 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3-302(a)(2)(ii) (2013). 
59 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §3-103 (2002 Repl. Vol.). 
60 See In re Nieves, 648 F.3d 232, 239-240 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We therefore arrive at 
the conclusion that the objective good-faith standard probes what the transferee 
knew or should have known, taking into consideration the customary practices of the 
industry in which the transferee operates” (internal citation omitted)). 
61 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3-406(a) (2013). 
62 Id. 
